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The aim of this article is to understand permanence and changes inside organizational routines. For 
this purpose, it seems important to explain how individual and collective memorisation occurs, so 
as to grasp how knowledge can be converted into routines. Although memorisation mechanisms 
imply a degree of durability, our procedural and declarative knowledge, and our memorisation 
processes, evolve so that individuals and organisations can project themselves into the future and 
innovate. Some authors highlight the necessity of dreaming and forgetting (Bergson 1896); others 
believe that emotions play a role in our memorisation processes (Damasio 1994). These dimensions 
are not only important at the individual level but also in an organisational context (Lazaric and 
Denis 2005; Reynaud 2005; Pentland and Feldman 2005).I review the individual dimension of these 
memorisation processes, with the Anderson’s distinction between procedural knowledge and 
declarative knowledge.  I discuss the notion of cognitive automatisms in order to show why routines 
should be investigated beyond their first literal assumption (Bargh, 1997). This leads to a clear 
understanding of the micro level that underpins organisational flexibility and adaptation (notably 
the motivational triggers). Within organisations, the memorisation mechanisms are at once similar 
and diverse. Indeed, organisations use their own filters and mechanisms to generate organisational 
coordination. Organizational memory has its own dimension as it does not merely consist of the 
sum of individual knowledge and must be able to survive when individuals leave. Routines depend 
on the organisational memory implemented and on the procedural knowledge and representations of 
it (individual and collective representations).  
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 “We are right when we say that habit is formed by the repetition of an effort; but what would be the use 
of repeating it, if the result were always to reproduce the same thing? The true effect of repetition is to 
decompose, and then to recompose, and thus appeal to the intelligence of the body. In this sense, a 
movement is learnt when the body has been made to understand it.” (Bergson, 1896:137) 
 
 
“The first records, in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time; it 
leaves to each fact, to each gesture, its place and date. Regardless of utility or of practical application, 
it stores up the past by the mere necessity of its own nature. But every perception is prolonged into a 
nascent action; and while the images are taking their place and order in this memory, the movements 
which continue them modify the organism, and create in the body new dispositions towards action”( 
Bergson, ibid: 92). 
 
 
  Introduction 
 
The literal meaning of the term « routine » can cause one to assume that this concept is mundane. 
Furthermore, in everyday language, the term « routine » has a negative connotation because it is seen as 
a form of cognitive automatism that relegates this process to a backdrop position, far from the league of 
«  grand  », carefully designed and implemented strategic plans.  Routines are seen as unconscious 
whereas decision-making is thought to be deliberate and intentional.  This point of view, shared by 
many researchers is unlikely to foster progress in the scientific debate.  
 
A careful look at the empirical studies conducted in cognitive science is enough to see that major 
advances have been made on the question of memorization processes.  Thus, the reflection  (see 
quotation above) undertaken by Bergson (ibid), who introduced the notions of individual freedom, 
motivation and free will in the study of memorization processes, was for the most part validated by 
contemporary studies. Some researchers pay homage to this original thinker who formulated in a very 
precise way something which cognitive science was to prove much later (Squire 2004).  If the debate on 
the forms of memorization and on cognitive automatisms has always been a delicate and controversial 
one because it lays bare, from the start, the potential limitations of our consciousness; it nonetheless 
constitutes a philosophical question, which may highly relevant to that of organizational routines.  
 
Indeed, the conceptualization of organizational routines has evolved and now includes the notion of 
procedural knowledge (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994), or that of « recurrent interactions patterns » (Cohen 
et al., 1996) or even of change driven by individuals (Feldman 2000). One could think at first that these 
  1definitions cannot be reconciled or even that they are antagonistic. But this would be ignoring the 
contributions of cognitive science, which has always emphasized that free will is essential to 
memorization (Bargh 1997). The example of the learning driver shows how cognitive automatisms do 
exist and are necessary, but it also shows that the latter are acquired through a long learning process in 
which motivation plays a far from negligible role in the formation and transformation of routines. Thus 
the debate on individual memorization processes is in many ways relevant to collective forms of 
memorization. The notion of « mindfulness » developed by Langer (1979) and reexamined recently 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006 ; Levinthal and Rerup 2006) points to organizations’ intentional efforts to 
avoid being lulled by the organizational routines they activate on a daily basis and to remain vigilant at 
all times in order to give sense to their daily work and to learn by questioning their existing practices.  
This debate enables us to truly understand the implications of the notion of organizational routines and 
to better explain enduring criticisms or misunderstandings (Becker 2004; Abel, Felin and Foss 2007).   
 
In the first section of this article we get right into the cognitive science debate and explore the concepts 
of cognitive automatism, of procedural and declarative knowledge. I show that the studies conducted in 
this field have been strongly influenced by the mind-as-computer metaphor and that it has taken a great 
amount of work to refine and complete this representation. In the second section, I show why 
motivation and individual freedom are important mechanisms in the processes of collective 
memorization.  We emphasize that this mechanism of intrinsic change co-evolves with other forms of 
changes, and particularly with change in the environment.  I conclude on the new factors of change in 
routines and show to what extent they can help us better understand and interpret the co-evolution of 
individual and organizational levels.  
 
 
I) Inside the cognitive black box and beyond: routines and memorization processes 
 
Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) define routines as procedural knowledge. In order to introduce this issue, 
the content of this knowledge and its opposite form has to be debated.  
Anderson was one of the first authors to have made a distinction between declarative and procedural 
memory and to have popularized these notions. In this section, I shall talk about Anderson’s distinction 
between procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge, and will show that “proceduralisation” 
processes are in no way automatic and that individuals can consciously choose the degree of stability 
inside their knowledge. Studies in cognitive science have discussed the notion of cognitive automatisms 
(Shiffrin and Schneider 1977) and have pointed to their temporal and contextual nature (Cohen 1991, 
Cohen and Bacdayan ibid). Emotions are also a determining factor in our memorization processes and it 
is therefore important to observe them closely if one is to grasp the difficulties of individual 
memorization and routinisation processes. They impact on the quality of the memorization process and 
on the setting up of potential cognitive automatisms. 
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1.1) The origin of the concept of the procedural knowledge: Anderson’s distinction between two 
forms of memories  
 
  Many authors regard the distinction between procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge as 
fundamental to understanding the development of routines.  For example M. Cohen (1991) who, based 
on Anderson’s works, distinguishes two forms of memorization: the memorization of procedural 
knowledge and that of declarative knowledge.  
 
Taking into account the studies on artificial intelligence (Winograd 1975) and a criticism of behaviorist 
analyses – which focused on the external manifestation of behavior and not its content – Anderson, 
following Simon’s steps, observed the course of mental processes in order to understand their driving 
forces. Based on Simon’s distinction between short-term memory and long-term memory, Anderson 
introduced a key notion: that of declarative memory, which plays a key role between “working 
memory” and “production memory” (Anderson (1976)).  The graph below summarizes his argument 
(figure 1).  
 
In 1976, Anderson developed the idea that one form of memory collected facts and that another stored 
and recorded them. This notion was refined and clarified in 1983, a time during which Anderson 






Figure 1:  The Declarative memory between production memory and working memory: Source 
Anderson 1976. 
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Later on, Anderson’s research used the criticisms of artificial intelligence to go beyond the metaphor of 
the mind as a simple computer and to explore new directions. Indeed, starting from the Ryle’s 
distinction between “know that “ and “know how”, Winograd underlines why the expert system can 
only encode two representations of knowledge: the knowledge encoded independently from the 
programme and the knowledge mobilized when the programme is being used.  In this context, 
declarative knowledge may exist independently of its use, whereas procedural knowledge translates into 
in a specific behavior. This makes it possible to operationally separate the knowledge that is easily 
accessible, communicable, and usable because it is independent and varied, from the knowledge that is 
used to solve a problem
1.  
 
Declarative memory concerns more specifically the recollection of facts, events and propositions 
(Anderson 1983, Cohen 1991).  It is not linked to a specific use and can be used for several purposes.  
In particular, it can be “re-organized” in order to find the solution to a problem.  It therefore mobilizes 
facts and technical or scientific principles that are different from know-how.  Procedural memory, on 
the other hand, concerns know-how, how things are done, the knowledge that is put to use.  Part of this 
knowledge can be expressed through routines and rests on “patterned sequences of learned behavior 
involving multiple actors” (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994: 557).   
 
Anderson focuses more particularly on the creation of procedural knowledge.  Indeed, he believes that 
declarative knowledge is converted into procedural knowledge thanks to the processes through which 
declarative knowledge is interpreted and selected.  Interpretation leaves a trace in the working memory 
and repetition converts this declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge thanks to a compilation 
mechanism.  The creation of some ‘production rules’ and their successful repetition increases their 
efficiency and, thus, their probability of being selected again. Anderson explains that ‘knowledge 
automatisation’ occurs once knowledge has been used frequently over time for a specific purpose 
increasing consequently performance and speed.  This observation was introduced for explaining 
several clinical studies that have shown that the two forms of memory may be dissociated. A patient 
suffering from amnesia, for example, might no longer memorize declarative knowledge but his 
memorization of procedural knowledge is not affected.  The case of a patient who did not remember the 
daily visits of his doctor, but could still play chess with great precision (Cohen 1991) is but one of many 
cases that have made it possible to distinguish several types of memorization in individuals (Cohen 
1984, Cohen and Eichenbaum 1993).  
 
                                                 
1 Anderson distances himself from the artificial intelligence approach and bases his analysis on his “Adaptative 
Control of Thought” (or ACT) theory, to understand the transition from the status of declarative intelligence to that 
of procedural intelligence.  
 
  4These two forms of memory do not have implications at the level of individual memorization alone. 
Indeed, as we shall see later, they generate specific representations of knowledge, creating different 
forms of organizational memory. Furthermore, they can promote the creation of cognitive automatisms 
that play a role in the individual and collective routinisation process. This is the reason why Anderson’s 
distinction is based on two questions that have been fundamental to the study of routines: are there 
automatic procedures that make it possible to convert declarative knowledge into procedural 
knowledge? Are there cognitive automatisms that can govern the human spirit? These questions, which 
many in cognitive science have tried to answer, deserve to be examined here.  
 
1.2. The latest works in cognitive science  
 
121 Squire’s extension and refinement of Bergson’s theory  
 
According to Squire two pioneers have had great influence in the field of cognitive science. William 
James (1890) with his work “Principles of Psychology” and Henri Bergson who was a French 
philosopher (1859-1941). 
 
Bergson’s works were pioneering in their conceptualization of memorization processes (Squire, 2004)
2 . 
Indeed, for this French philosopher, there are two forms of memorization: memorization in the form of 
representations, and memorization in action. Bergson distinguishes a memory that stores the facts of our 
daily life such as images, from a memory that materializes into motor mechanisms through the 
recollection of stored facts. Bergson takes the example of the lesson learnt by heart, and which, through 
repetition results in a form of automatism.  He likens this form of memory to habit-memory, opposing it 
to image-memory that does not rely on pure repetition and maintains an important degree of 
imagination:  
“To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw ourselves from the action 
of the moment, we must have the power to value the useless, we must have the will to dream” 
(Bergson, ibid, 94) 
 
                                                 
2  Henri Bergson wrote the first edition of “Matter and Memory” in 1896 and “Creative evolution” in 1907. He 
was highly influenced by Spencer’s work.  There are many similarities between Bergson’s work and his book 
“Matter and Memory” and William James’ approach to habits. Bergson grants great importance to the notion of 
perception initially developed by William James.  Just as James did, he thought that perception and emotion play a 
key role in our cognitive faculties.  Bergson was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1927. Throughout his 
works, he strongly argued that intuition was deeper than pure reason and was also influenced by Spencer’s 
evolutionist ideas. However, in “Creative evolution”, Bergson argues that creative urge, not the Darwinian concept 
of natural selection, is at the heart of selection. It is also said that Bergson (who married Marcel Proust’s cousin in 
1881) gave Marcel Proust the idea for his great novel “Remembrance of things past” (1913-1927). 
 
  5According to Bergson, there is permanent tension between the memory turned towards the present 
action and the memory that tends to distance itself from action.  Hence the selection between motor 
habits and their representations:  
 “The nascent generality of the idea consists, then, in a certain activity of the mind, in a movement 
between action and representation” (Bergson, ibid:324).   
 
Moreover, Bergson goes further in his description of the memorization process in that he emphasizes 
how the body accompanies the memorization process. The body is involved in this cognitive effort in 
that together the body and spirit provide direction and meaning to the memorization process.  
 
Squire’s approach (2004) might initially be disconcerting because it seems to point to the existence of a 
multitude of memorization processes. But in fact, it is more a decomposition of the procedural memory 
into different facets and learning zones that it describes.  Indeed, following Bergson, we could subdivide 
memory into a declarative form (where we build representations) and a non-declarative form (zone of 
reflex and automatisms).  This recent concept makes it possible to locate the areas in the body where 
different types of knowledge are created and stabilized. Emotions are part of this configuration and 
correspond to a specific area that stores long-term memories. 
 
Squire (2004) uses and extends Bergson’s distinction to the principle of declarative and non-declarative 
knowledge.  Like James, he underlines that there are many forms of memorization.  Some are more able 
to collect facts whereas others are directly operational, while others still are related to more emotional 
forms of memorization located in other parts of the brain, particularly in the “amygdala” area. Each 
specific form of memorization is associated to a physiological area. This does not constitute a break 
from Anderson’s work, but a diversification of the non-declarative form of memorization, which helps 
to gain a better understanding of the various learning processes where emotions and reflexes are 
included as specific types of functioning located in a particular area.  According to Squire (2004):   
 
“Declarative memory allows remembered material to be compared and contrasted. It supports the 
encoding of memories in terms of relationships among multiple items and events. The stored 
representations are flexible and can guide performance under a wide range of test conditions. 
Declarative memory is representational. It provides a way to model the external world and a model 
of the world it is either true or false. It is dispositional and expressed through performance rather 
than recollection. Non-declarative forms of memory occur as modifications within specialized 
performance systems. The memories are revealed through reactivation of the systems within the 
learning originally occurred” (Squire, 2004: 172-173).  
 
  6This representation of the various forms of memorization is illustrated in the graph below (figure 2)  
 
 
Figure 2:  Declarative and non-declarative forms of memories 
(Source: Squire, ibid: 173). 
 
Squire’s theory has now been largely accepted within the cognitive science community (Eichenbaum 
1997; Eichenbaum, Cohen 2001; Milner, Squire and Kandel 1999; Schacter, Wagner, Buckner 2000). 
This argument is partly based on James’ pioneering works, which underlined the flexibility of habits 
and showed that the various forms of memorization are found in different parts of the brain and are 
inter-connected (James 1890 in Thompson 1990).  
 
In this vein, Eichenbaum argues that there is no unique circuit through which non-declarative 
knowledge is converted into declarative knowledge during the execution or modification of a task; 
different circuits (“brain circuits”) are at play and have distinct functions in the “hippocampus”. 
Declarative knowledge is essential here in that it makes it possible to avoid over-simplified behaviors 
characterized by some rigidity in a context of repetition.  Declarative memory is characterized by 
“representational flexibility” enabling it to adapt to new situations, contrary to the non declarative forms 
of memorization that are thought to be more rigid (Eichenbaum, ibid, p. 554).  
 
1.2.2 Damasio’s theory of emotions 
The question here is therefore to determine, in cognitive and social sciences, the degree of plasticity of 
both forms of memory. Indeed, although non-declarative memory involves an emotional zone that has 
an impact on motor sensory processes; it is highly probable that these forms of memorization are far 
  7from inert. This is precisely what Damasio suggests when he argues that emotions play an important 
role in our cognitive faculties (Damasio, 1994).  
 
Our memory does not merely consist of archiving or storing documents or images that enable us to 
observe the past.  On the contrary, our memory rests on representations made of recollections that 
enable us to implement our potential representations and use them.  This notion of images could also be 
found in Boulding’s work (1956) for whom our knowledge base is built around our recollection of 
images that guide our future and present behavior, a “vision of the world” so to speak
3. Representations 
serve to build the future, to create new knowledge and to stabilize the knowledge we use daily. They are 
made not only of images but also of emotions.  
 
When an individual faces a difficult situation and needs to make a precise choice, or elaborate a 
strategy, the challenge is to be able to implement a solution that will not be the fruit of past learning 
only.  The act of inventing then rests on analogies and action combined with intuition and reason.  
Damasio (ibid) shows that if a truly new situation emerges, intense emotions play a role in the 
resolution of this problem.  Emotions then serve to project oneself into the future and to make decisions. 
Contrary to what one could think, they are not the enemy of the mind but accompany the latter; 
otherwise, there could be no true invention or creativity.  This work is based on the somatic markers 
hypothesis which, based on clinical observations, has shed light on how the brain, when faced with a 
new situation, activates part of its resources in different ways. Indeed, the attention required to carry out 
a new task or face a new problem, mobilizes a certain somatic state that activates the biological 
regulation of the dorso-lateral area.  
 
“The somatic marker mechanism stimulates those of the working memory and of the attention 
related to future scenarios. In short, we cannot form an appropriate theoretical representation of 
our own psychological state and that of others if we do not have a mechanism such as that of 
somatic markers” (Damasio, ibid: 278). 
 
The concept of somatic markers is particularly interesting here. Indeed, using the latest studies in 
cognitive science, Damasio has shown that every time a cognitive effort is made, there is a localized 
activation of our neurons. Neurologists have been able to visualize this cognitive effort that activates 
certain localized zones of our brains and bodies. This example tries to show why the creation of 




                                                 
3  For a survey on the theories of knowledge, see Lazaric and Lorenz (2003). 
 
  81.3. Theories on cognitive automatisms and their implication  
 
The question of cognitive automatisms is not new and has been the object of much research.  Bergson 
proposed, long ago, a philosophical answer to this question by emphasizing that the will was inalienable 
and that consciousness could not be reduced to mere repetition.  Studies conducted in cognitive science 
have also shown that cognitive automatisms evolve in parallel with consciousness and deliberation 
processes.  These studies deserve to be examined more closely because they are central to the questions 
of change in memorization forms.  
 
131 The classical debate on cognitive automatisms 
 
The question of cognitive automatisms was first addressed from the perspective of individuals’ attention 
and their limited capacities.  R. M Shiffrin, with Atkinson, started his works in 1968, focusing more 
particularly on memory control processes (Atkinson & Shiffrin 1968).  A few years later, he and 
Schneider started their research on cognitive automatisms (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977), distinguishing 
two types of information processing. The controlled process is performed more slowly and requires 
great attention. The automatic process, on the contrary, does not require attention in order to be 
performed; because it is anchored in long-term memory.  The controlled processing, on the other hand, 
is maintained in the working memory, which requires conscious effort and sustained attention (Camus, 
1988: 64). Furthermore, as Camus underlines, tha automatic process can be mobilized consciously.  
 
“An automatic process can be prepared by a controlled process.  That is to say that an individual 
can consciously decide to enact an automatic activity.  Controlled processing can help improve 
automatic processing of information.  Indeed, the information processed automatically is transient 
and labile and its storing in the working memory takes no longer than a few seconds.  If automatic 
processing requires more time, controlled processing enables individuals to maintain active the 
information that is necessary for automatic processing” (Camus, ibid: 66).  
 
Schneider and Shiffrin’s research has influenced the research protocol in cognitive science.  Their work 
is based on the fact that visual automatism is different from motor-sensory automatism. Schmidt 
reckons that in the context of motor-skill development, automatism is comparable to a flexible and 
parametrizable pattern more than to a rigid process (Schmidt 1975: 83). In keeping with this line of 
research on visual capacities and their automatic encoding, Kahneman distinguishes several levels of 
automatism: a highly automatic type of information processing that does not require any particular 
attention; a partly automatic process which attention can influence, and finally information processing 
that is occasionally automatic and requires attention (Kahneman and Charzick 1983; Kahneman and 
Treisman 1984).  This distinction has led cognitive science to put in perspective these forms of 
automatism:  
  9 
“There is widespread consensus around the notion that, notwithstanding exceptions, a behavior 
understood as an observable response to a given situation, cannot be considered as totally 
automatic:  Only some components of the processing underlying this behavior can be considered 
totally automatic” (Perruchet, 1988: 9).  
 
These studies concur with and complement the work of Anderson. They explain and put in perspective 
the automatic process implemented by individuals. In the so-called proceduralisation phase, domain 
knowledge is directly incorporated into procedures for the execution of skills, which makes it possible 
to mobilize working memory less, but can also lead to errors or misses if the compilation phase is too 
short.  In other words, the transition from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge remains a 
delicate operation because the automatic process can lock some know-how into tight procedures. 
Human judgment is thus necessary to update these procedures. 
 
132.  J. Bargh’s contributions 
 
John Bargh has proposed a theory on cognitive automatisms.  He nuances his approach by putting 
motivation at the center of his analysis and proposes a synthesis of several research studies in 
psychology to progressively integrate the principles of motivations such as they are described in the 
« self determination theory » or «SDT ».  Bargh’s theory could be considered in direct continuity to 
Anderson’s works because he focuses on the procedural dimension of cognitive mechanisms.  
 
“An automatic mental phenomenon occurs reflexively whenever certain triggering conditions are 
in place; when those conditions are present, the process runs off autonomously, independently of 
conscious guidance (Anderson 1992; Bargh 1989, 1996).  Thus research and theory in both 
domains, social psychology and automaticity, have, at the core, the specification of “if – then” 
relations between situational events and circumstances on the one hand, and cognitive, emotional 
and behavioural effects on the other” (Bargh, ibid:3).  
 
The aim is to observe to what extent the emotional, cognitive and motivational conditions that 
characterize an environment can constitute the basis of a preconscious psychological state that can 
generate an automatic response – automatic in that it escapes the individual’s awareness and direct 
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Figure 3: Bargh’s auto-motive model 
 
This hypothesis shall be discussed further later.  The underlying idea – which Bargh borrowed from 
Whitehead (1911) and Sriffin and Dumais (1981) – is that the routinisation of certain procedures helps 
an individual focus his/her attention on essential, new and creative tasks.  This is an essential point in 
the analysis of routinisation and we shall examine it more closely later. 
 
What is new compared to the traditional theory on cognitive automatisms is the manner in which Bargh 
analyses motivation.  Indeed, nothing happens by accident. First of all, before walking can become an 
automatic process, we have learnt how to walk; and second of all we intend to walk (Bargh, ibid, 28).  
Bargh even talks of an « auto-motive model » to explain to what extent mental representations are 
essential to the development of cognitive mechanisms.  
 
The motivation / free will hypothesis enables Bargh to free himself from the computer metaphor in 
which cognition is reduced to serial processing; and to envisage mental processes as processes that rely 
on parallel or connectionist mechanisms
4.  Mental processes evolve in parallel with various perceptual 
and motivational mechanisms.  As highlighted by the Simonian approach, cognition is not the only 
driving force behind this dynamic, nor is it the only element of the decisional process. The interactions 
between cognition and motivation are therefore essential and must be taken into account. Consciousness 
is essential in that it initiates the process of skill acquisition and the process through which the 
                                                 
4 This raises a number of problems.  Indeed though mental processes can be considered as relying on simultaneous 
and/or parallel mechanisms, the body operates differently from the mind.  The body is not capable of generating 
processes in a parallel manner.  According to Bargh, consciousness can enable the subject to adjust what the mind 
and what the body can do.  The serial aspect is reintroduced because it enables the individual to adjust what he/she 
wants to do and what he/she actually can do!! 
 
  11individual modifies these skills; thus it can detect possible tensions arising during the acquisition of 
cognitive processes: 
 
« But even in the case of these automatic motivations, it is possible for a person to become aware 
of his or her actions and, as in the case of bad habits, attempt to change those behavior patterns. 
This question of how automatic and conscious motivations interact when in conflict is one of 
practical as well theoretical importance, and we are now investigating parameters of this 
interaction” ( Bargh, ibid,  52).  
 
 
133. Consciousness and free will in memorization process  
 
As Bargh & Chartrand (1999) acknowledge, the question of consciousness in mental processes has 
always been a thorny one, but current research tries to show why the co evolution of the potential 
automaticity and of free will is far form being a myth.  The aim is to understand why and in what 
context a shift occurs from a so-called « more automatic » process to a so-called « more deliberate » and 
conscious phase
5.   
 
Though the debate over the role of consciousness in memorization processes is not new, it was for a 
long time perceived as a philosophical issue rather than as a real question about a psychological process 
that deserved to be studied.  Bergson had already answered this question in a literary manner by 
highlighting why repetition is not the contrary of free will.  Indeed, in order to memorize something, 
one must make sense of it otherwise the body does not follow the process. Both forms of memory being 
closely interwoven, Bergson puts automatic memorization processes in perspective by highlighting the 
role played by individuals’ free will and freedom in the process of memorization.  
 
“We are right when we say that habit is formed by the repetition of an effort; but what would be the 
use of repeating it, if the result were always to reproduce the same thing? The true effect of 
repetition is to decompose, and then to recompose, and thus appeal to the intelligence of the body. 
In this sense, a movement is learnt when the body has been made to understand it.” (Bergson, 
ibid:137) 
 
Furthermore, Bergson shows that although our memory is tuned to our body, “what is automatic in the 
evocation of remembrances” has been greatly exaggerated (Bergson, ibid: 117). And in this automatic 
memorization tendency there are:  
 
                                                 
5 This synthesis is recent; indeed for many years psychology attempted to separate these processes instead of 
viewing them as working together, and empirical studies focused on one of the phases without managing to 
coordinate all the interacting cognitive processes.    
 
  12“inner movements of repeating and recognizing that are like a prelude to voluntary attention. They 
mark the limit between the voluntary and the automatic” (Bergson ibid: 145, my emphasize) 
 
What Bergson highlighted, at the dawn of the 20th century, without being able to demonstrate it 
scientifically (that is experimentally with subjects in the process of learning) was that consciousness, 
freedom and free will were all involved in the same memorization process.  Contemporary research has 
confirmed and refined Bergson’s hypothesis but decades were necessary to reach to this conclusion 
because « Free will has always been something of a problem for behavioral scientists » (Carver, 1997, 
98).  And because the studies in biology and psychology were all based on the behaviorist paradigm, it 
took a long time to dismantle it and construct new hypotheses.  
 
Recent studies converge on the fact that the consciousness vs. automaticity opposition is a dichotomy 
that is no longer valid because it has now become clear that consciousness accompanies, rather than 
replaces, the processes of automatisation (Baumeister & Sommer 1997; Tzelgov 1997; Bargh and 
Chartrand 1997; Carver ibid, Gardner and Cacioppo, 1997).  Psychologists agree that both processes 
evolve together; which leaves unanswered the question of what context and environment cause this 
process to stop.  Indeed:  
 
“Consciousness is a state of relative indeterminacy. Consciousness creates a hole or gap in the 
deterministic web of causal relationships that shapes human behavior so to speak. Under familiar 
comfortable circumstances, certain causes lead smoothly to certain behavioral responses. 
Consciousness can disrupt and alter those connections, thereby disengaging behavior from its 
usual causes” (Baumeister & Sommer,ibid, 79).  
 
 
Furthermore, acknowledging the role of consciousness and free will in memorization processes implies 
recognizing that chance and the environment have a limited role.  In terms of memorization, this boils 
down to no longer focusing all attention on the mechanisms of procedural knowledge learning, and to 
acknowledging the fact that declarative knowledge is an essential tool in the memorization process.   
  
In other words the transition from representation to action is a mechanism that needs to be explained if 
we are to understand how our procedural knowledge evolves and why there is a gap between what an 
individual thinks he/she does and what he/she actually does (Tzelgov, 1997).  In short, declarative and 
procedural knowledge appear to be indissociable and understanding the origin of their co-evolution is 
critical for perceiving the link between individual and organizational routines.   
 
134  Routines and cognitive automatisms : some potential semantic confusion  
 
  13The debate on organizational routines and automatisms has always had a more or less positive 
connotation because, even though contemporary research has intentionally distanced itself from the 
literal meaning of the term “routine”, a good number of researchers seeking to observe organizational 
routines have always associated this research to processes that actually present little interest:  «  It 
suggests the routine, mindless operation of thousands of people turned into mechanized pieces »  (D. 
Cohen, 1997:129).  We shall see later in this article why this debate on consciousness (mindful vs. 
mindless) has been at the heart of the questions of organizational attention and routines.   
 
From a wider point of view, it is interesting to note that the notion of “cognitive automatism” is not used 
in cognitive sciences only.  Many economists have used it in their studies (Schumpeter, 1926 or more 
recently Kahneman, 2000) to explain decision-making processes and forms of individual rationality.  
This term -« Automatismus eines ausbalancierten Kreislaufs” (Schumpeter, 1926: 112)-  used in 1926 
by Schumpeter literally means “Automatism of a balanced circular flow” in English and was translated 
as “The routines of the circular flow” in the English version of 1934 (Becker, Knudsen March, 2006: 
354). Many other terms were introduced in the English translation in which he was personally involved. 
Thus, there has for a long time been a confusion or analogy between both terms, in economic and 
cognitive science works alike. This source of misunderstanding must be emphasized as the actual notion 
of  “routines” is faraway from the initial sense given by Schumpeter in 1926, because contemporary 
studies in cognitive, social and organizational sciences have provided new representations to address the 




II) Towards new micro foundations of organizational routines? 
 
Approaching the individual dimension as a driving force behind the evolution and change in routines 
does not necessarily imply the mobilization of so-called “methodological individualism” as a 
framework of analysis.  According to Abel, Felin and Foss (2007), change in routines, such as it is 
described by Nelson and Winter (idid) is only determined by external processes, that is, processes of 
competitive pressure that modify firms’ characteristics.  In other words, the sources of change are 
exogenous and not endogenous.  Two questions arise from this: one related to the debate on the level of 
analysis (should one examine knowledge at individual or organizational level?) and another one related 
to the intentional or non-intentional nature of this change.  
 
We shall address these issues in order to fully understand the organizational level.  Moreover we shall 
integrate new complementary insights. Indeed the development of routines appears to require will and 
sustained effort so that new procedural memory can be created. The organizational dimension deserves 
careful observation because it is the locus where the individual and collective efforts are coordinated.  
  14This debate is far form neutral to fully understand the evolution and stability of routines and their 




2. 1.  Does what we know about individuals’ memorization processes apply to organizations?  
 
Researchers often borrow references from cognitive science to explain individual memorization, but this 
can make it difficult for them to shift their analysis to the organizational level.  This results in 
epistemological levels (if one does not refer to the same theories of memory 
5) and ontological 
approaches that differ according to the level of granularity and of analysis from which the question is 
examined (Lazaric, 2000).  However, even if individuals do not memorize in the same way 
organizations do, it is important to recognize their memorization processes in order to understand how 
they can develop certain forms of memorization and how the later impact and foster collective 
memorization.  
 
This debate, which has brought us into the heart of cognitive science, has raised the fundamental 
methodological question of how analyses of individual knowledge could be transposed to the level of 
organizational knowledge. Indeed, several authors consider that organizations do not “remember” in the 
literal sense of the term. Bartlett (1961), although he shared Bergson’s point of view concerning the re-
composition within individual learning processes, had his doubts concerning organizational memory.  
He favored the term “memory within the group” over the term “memory of the group” (Paoli and 
Prencipe 2003).  Thus, it appears that the concept of “organizational memory” should not be understood 
literally but at metaphoric level (Divry and Lazaric 1998). Michael Cohen and Bacdayan are confronted 
with the same question in their observation of collective forms of memorization that go beyond 
individual forms of memorization.   
 
The hypothesis that routines are distributed, was confirmed through a study on card games, helps to 
understand how routines form at individual level, and how they are transferred within a group, without 
the players having to consciously elaborate a strategy of knowledge exchange and transfer (Cohen and 
Bacdayan, 1994). Indeed, in their experiment, the card players do not speak to each other and yet 
develop common strategies and rules of action that are transferred within their group. The concept of 
“transactive memory” (Wegner 1987; Wegner et al. 1991) is in the same vein for explaining how 
individuals’ memory lies within a social context.  Indeed an experimental study was repeated in a 
laboratory in order to test how groups performed a task. Liang et al (1995) identify three factors of 
performance that form the “transactive memory”.  The first effect is the specialization of certain aspects 
                                                 
5 The Simonian approach differs from Polanyi’s approach. And these are but two examples of the different 
cognitive theories used in the analysis of routines.  
  15and the differences between the groups according to whether or not their members were trained 
together; the second is coordination, i.e. the individuals who know each other will cooperate more 
naturally and in a more flexible way; the third is knowing and being able to trust other individuals’ 
skills.  Liang et al’s study shows that the groups whose members were trained together perform better 
than the groups whose members were trained individually, hence the importance of interactions between 
individuals and the development of a “transactive memory”.  
The literature on organizational memory provides an explanation of why organizations’ memory is not 
the sum of individual knowledge, but part of the latter, which will be used and activated within 
organizational routines.  Organizational memory is thus “collective beliefs, behavioural routines, or 
physical artefacts that vary in their content, level, dispersion and accessibility” (Moorman and Miner, 
1997).  
 
On the basis of this definition, several authors have attempted to determine the impact of the content of 
organizational memory. Indeed, the centralized or decentralized nature of an organization, as well as the 
level of memorization (intense or low) has an impact on the firm’s creativity – for example on its 
economic performance and creativity during the launch of new products. Thus, Moorman and Miner 
(ibid) underline the difficulty of determining, in practice, the right dosage of procedural memory and of 
declarative memory.  Too much procedural memory within organizations can hinder creativity because 
then, firms find it difficult to absorb new knowledge. This balance is also very sensitive to changes in 
the environment. If organizational memory is dispersed but contains a minimal level of procedural 
knowledge, firms can then innovate and create new products even in a turbulent environment. However, 
the dispersion of knowledge can have a negative impact on competitiveness in the case of a turbulent 
environment, and a positive impact on creativity and performance in the context of a relatively stable 
environment.  The conclusions of the study show that a sufficient degree of procedural knowledge 
enables firms to absorb new knowledge, but that the nature of this knowledge (centralized or scattered) 
has a structuring impact in the ability to assimilate (Moorman and Miner, ibid)
6.  
 
Thus, the debate on methodological individualism could be questioned here.  Though memorization is 
done by individuals, organizations are characterized by a collective form of memorization that enables 
them to maintain internal coherence and their long-term viability.  An organization must also coordinate 
the beliefs and subjective representations of its staff in order to exist as a coherent entity.  An 
                                                 
6 A complementary study was conducted in some firms of the food-processing industry; it shows that a high 
degree of procedural knowledge has a positive impact on efficiency but a negative impact on creativity, and that it 
is necessary for both forms of memory to evolve together in order to stabilise the organisation and promote its 
creativity. Indeed, food-processing firms tend to extensively codify their practice, which creates important 
amounts of procedural knowledge but reduces their innovation capacity. Indeed, the combination of large amounts 
of procedural knowledge with internal or external information flows does not allow for creativity; this is due to the 
fact that the high degree of existing procedural knowledge hinders the absorption and assimilation of new 
information (Kyariapoulos and Ruyter, ibid.). This result is in keeping with other studies concerning ISO standards 
that underline why the implementation of ISO standards has a positive impact on attention and detail at the 
expense of innovation capacities (Naveh and Erz, 2004). 
 
  16organization that does not do so is bound to failure because it would then be incapable of developing a 
common organizational culture to which individuals can refer.  Furthermore, the analysis of routines 
cannot focus exclusively on the organizational or macroeconomic level (with a holistic framework of 
analysis), but must envisage routines as the result of the interaction between the individual and 
collective dimensions.  An analysis at organizational level therefore helps explain this apparent 
dichotomy.  Thus:  
 
“Organizational routines are a unit of analysis that allows capturing a level of granularity 
significant for organizational change. (An analysis that remains too much on a macro-level will be 
systematically incapable of capturing many interactions and their effects on actors and the 
environment). Considering routines enables the researcher to ‘zoom in’ on micro-level dynamics 
and identify driving forces of change on that level.” (Becker et al . 2005: 776).  
 
 
2.2 Endogenous or exogenous change 
 
The origin of change in routines is a question that deserves particular attention.  In the first part of this 
article   I have focused more specifically on the endogenous sources of change in routines and discussed 
the different forms of memorization (declarative and procedural) by putting emphasis on the internal 
driving force behind this transformation: the motivation and free will of individuals.  This approach – 
particularly in terms of the forms of individual memorization and their evolutions – helps understand the 
debates that are specific to different disciplines and try to clarify the meaning of the concepts that are 
currently mobilized. Indeed few years ago change in routines was considered more likely to be 
determined by change in the environment (Cohen et al 1996: 683).   
 
This criticism also applied, more widely, to the Evolutionary Theory of change (Andersen 1994). Indeed 
Nelson and Winter’s works can, at first sight, be interpreted as meaning that the competitive 
environment and external forces are the only determinants of change in routines; but a more careful 
reading suggests otherwise.  
 
A source of competitive advantage definitely lies in the firm’s ability to copy routines that exist in other 
firms; but also and above in its ability to extend its own internal routines.  This internal extension of 
existing organizational forms may indeed be imperfect and costly, but it can also be a precious source of 
evolution and change.  Indeed, novelties are often produced through imperfect replication of internal 
elements (‘the combinatorics of routines’).  This is an element of reflection borrowed from Schumpeter 
and developed by Winter, to explain the extension and renewal of knowledge databases in a given 
competitive environment (Becker and Lazaric 2003; Becker, Knudsen and March, 2006).  
 
  17Finally, it is important to note that existing analyses of change in routines concentrate on internal or 
external changes, but few of them examine the possible interactions between both sources of change. 
Indeed, organizations have the ability to interpret external signs in many different ways; as a result, the 
intentional or non-intentional nature of change is often difficult, for an outsider, to observe. More 
longitudinal observations will be necessary in order to answer this puzzling question, and particularly to 
better understand how external signals are interpreted and how they can lead to internal organizational 
change (Galunic & Weeks 2002; Miner 1994; Plunket 2002).  This  question of primary importance for 
future research should  deserve full attention, for having a better understanding of the co-evolution of 
social  and cognitive processes as a double source of change in routines.  
 
2,3 Free will at the heart of the debate on organizational routines 
 
A question that arises when studying routines is that of their changes and renewal.  And as Feldman 
(2000) explicitly acknowledged, the fact that routines change is difficult to admit.  One can legitimately 
ask why.  What is more, admitting that routines change boils down to acknowledging that declarative 
and procedural memories co-evolve and that determination and consciousness also do; which means that 
routines are - as Langer suggested (Langer 1989  ; Langer and Modoveanu 2000)  - activated in a 
mindful manner.  
 
In fact, Langer recognizes that researchers in social sciences have tended to base their reflection on the 
mind-as-computer metaphor (Newell 1990).  This metaphor proved useful to characterize many 
situations but over time it has become an analogy and a veritable « epistemological obstacle », in the 
sense meant by Bachelard (1938).  Thus, many scholars have been misled by this analogy in that they 
ended up thinking that the mind truly behaved liked a computer instead of seeing that the mind could, in 
a metaphorical way, bear a resemblance to a computer. 
7
 
  The mind-as-computer metaphor has made it possible to, often simplistically, envisage cognitive 
phenomena as algorithmic information processing, when in fact most cognitive processes are different 
(Lazaric and Mangolte 1999). Thus, for many years researchers approached routines from the angle of 
procedural knowledge only, forgetting about the significance of the meaning, origin and dynamic of that 
knowledge.  The problem is not the metaphor itself but the way it is interpreted.  For example Cohen 
and Bacdayan’s (1994) definition of routines as procedural knowledge is still valid as long as it is 
understood that this definition does not consider routines as involving the processing of congealed 
information, but rather of knowledge that evolves in a given organizational, social and institutional 
environment.   
 
                                                 
7 And metaphors are robust because they are difficult to invalidate empirically (Langer and Modoveanu 2000).  
 
  18This is the reason why Langer rested on the notion of “mindfulness” to highlight individuals’ attention 
inside cognitive automatisms.  In this theoretical perspective, individuals should make sense of what 
they do and perceive, by increasing their acuity so as to be able to integrate new information, to 
continuously update and refine their mental categories.  In short, and as Bergson highlighted, learning a 
lesson by heart is not enough to truly memorize it; in order to do so one must make sense of what one 
does and perceives (Bergson, ibid).  
 
Indeed, the notion of “mindfulness” emphasizes the necessity of focusing not so much on simple 
quantitative questions of data storing, but on the quality of the memorization. Experimental studies 
show that working groups that apply this principle memorize what they learn better and are more 
creative (Langer, ibid).  This principle has also been implemented in industrial work procedures and in 
complex technological environments so as to reduce the risk of accidents.  Observing industrial 
environments has made it possible to see that organizational mindfulness and individual consciousness 
were vital in preventing major technological disasters (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006). This implies 
that potential change in routines should not be seen as a fateful coincidence related to external and 
disruptive factors, but as a crucial ingredient to the revitalization of individuals and organizations.  This 
leads us to reconsider the very meaning of the term “routine” and to focus on individual and collective 
memorization processes.  
 
    “Routines now appear to be more mindful and more variable and to consume more attention 
that was first thought. The continuum of mindful action that had previously been masked has now 
become more difficult to ignore” (Weick and Sutcliffe,   2006:522).  
 
Indeed, organizations that apply procedures in an automatic fashion and without understanding them 
and the context in which they were implemented can eventually face serious difficulties. At 
organizational level, this has significant implications as indeed the organizations that rely on routines 
might, in their daily mobilization, forget the context in which they were learned and their significance.  
This is the reason why in some organizational contexts and certain collective tasks, some groups may 
tend to rely on old procedural knowledge without questioning its adequacy. This can lead to 
organizational inertia, conservatism, and even to spectacular catastrophes. The best known is that 
analyzed by Gersick and Hackman (1990).  These researchers have shown why certain groups of 
individuals tend to rely on old know-how without being able to call it into question when the situation 
requires such a change.  This can lead to an individual and/or collective inability to recognize new 
information and to consciously encode it into procedural memory.  For example, in the case of the air 
disaster of January 13th 1982, the crew proved incapable of questioning the usual procedures and to 
recognize that they were faced with a new situation in which heavy snow falls and the presence of ice in 
the engines called for the activation of the engine anti-ice system. The members of the crew seemed 
“locked” in traditional procedures and performed the usual tasks (check list) without modifying any.  
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This accident has led researchers to discuss the organizational problems that can arise within groups of 
individuals and the maintenance of certain automatic procedures that should have been eliminated. The 
failure of the aircraft crew to question their procedural knowledge could have been avoided if they had 
acted in a less routine-like fashion and had trusted their common sense. This shows the strength and 
weakness of procedural knowledge. Indeed, it is used to stabilize information but can also become a trap 
if its carriers do not call it into question on a regular basis.  This is the reason why some authors 
recommend that attention be focused, not only on the accumulation of knowledge but also on the 
destruction of the latter.  Indeed, there comes a time when individuals and organizations are incapable of 
absorbing new information.  In this regard, Bergson ( ibid)  thought it essential for individuals to dream 
in order to create new representations and to withdraw from the knowledge developed and destined for 
imminent use.  Other authors suggest the importance, at organizational level, of forgetting in order to be 
able to carry on learning. This “organizational forgetting” must be managed consciously and carefully 
so that crucial technological and organizational know-how is not occulted (Holan and Philips, 2004).  
 
In short we could say that “mindfulness” consists in the exploration of new frameworks or new mental 
representations whereas daily behavior tends to be “less mindful” as it consists in the exploitation of 
pre-existing information and knowledge (Levinthal and Rerup 2006).  Naturally this dichotomy is not 
apparent because both types of behavior are interdependent.  In all acts of creativeness, there are 
moments of regularity and in all regularity questions subsist. 
 
Moreover, as we shall see below, the activation of this individual and collective consciousness has its 
costs for an organization. In the context of the implementation of an expert system (Sachem) designed 
to help the operators make decisions concerning the functioning of a blast furnace at Usinor (a firm that 
latter became the ARCELOR group), I was able to observe, this delicate process of creating new 
collective representations.  Indeed various furnace operators differed in their representations of the 
technical processes and in some cases had opposite views on certain procedures:  the fluidization 
process in particular.  The dissection and articulation of existing knowledge forced the operators, 
through the creation of a common language, to examine and reconsider their pre-existing beliefs 
concerning the furnace and therefore their technical conceptions (Lazaric, Mangolte Massue, 2003).  
 
This revision of beliefs and the elaboration of a language shared by the various communities of furnace 
operators was a very long and costly process. This ambitious project of knowledge articulation and 
codification also shows the limitations of such an operation in the long term.  Indeed, the paradigm 
beliefs were dissected by calling into question the existing cognitive automatisms related to fluidization 
and by increasing “mindfulness” among operators so as to enable them to separate the so-called valid 
beliefs from the non-valid ones.  Moreover ‘mindfulness’ may be difficult to be permanently activated. 
In other words, the expert system - which was initially designed so as not to become a “cognitive 
  20prosthesis”, i.e. so that it would not become a substitute for individuals’ decision making power but on 
the contrary encourage them to use their free will in their final decision making (by analyzing the raw 
data and suggesting a possible action without even imposing it) – became a few years after its 
implementation a comfort zone on which the new comers rested to make decisions.  
 
The new furnace operators familiarized themselves with the expert system they helped put in place, but 
over time failed to call into question its architecture and the causal links between the various technical 
events.   Thus, the operators’ trust and familiarity with the system reduced their acuity particularly that 
of the new comers who had not taken part in its development and who then tended to consider this 
system as a quasi immovable technical state of the art.  Over time the operators questioned the 
architecture of the expert system less and less frequently, which shows that it is difficult for 
organizations to ensure that their staff remain “mindful” at all times.  This example also illustrates how 
and why social interactions foster cognitive dynamism.  In this case, the organizational trust that was 
necessary became, in turn, a form of obstacle by causing a routinisation of the collective practices, and 
therefore by reducing the operators’ ability to question what had taken them so much effort to develop.   
 
This raises the question of the role of individuals’ motivation and efforts in the various forms of 
memorization.  Effort and motivation are essential for individuals to be able to call into question and 
objectively examine some of their practices and beliefs.  As Langer recognized, there is a link between 
attention and motivation: “such mindful attention also results in a greater liking for the task and 
improved memory” (Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000: 3, underlined by us).  
 
2.4) Effort and motivation at the heart of routines 
 
Routines and routinisation processes should be understood not as processes that “freeze” procedural 
knowledge once and for all, but as processes through which knowledge evolves.  Indeed, the procedural 
and declarative knowledge held by individuals is not inert but memorized in a certain social and 
political context, which leads individuals to reconfigure it actively in order to either question or modify 
it in the course of action according to their understanding of a situation.  As Martha Feldman has 
highlighted in this regard:  
 
“Routines are performed by people who think and feel and care. Their reactions are situated in 
institutional, organizational and personal contexts. Their actions are motivated by will and 
intention. They create, resist, engage in conflict, and acquiesce to domination. All these forces 
influence the enactment of organizational routines and create a tremendous potential for change” 
(Feldman, 2000: 614). 
 
  21241) The possible modulation of an effort convention to face the hierarchy 
 
Several interpretations are possible for this resistance of individuals.  The first interpretation, found in 
theoretical and empirical literature, is related to the implicit or explicit resistance to hierarchy.  Indeed, 
individuals are not passive to the new organizational practices suggested by the hierarchy. In an 
organizational context, individuals can also display inertial behavior because organizational changes can 
disrupt the “organizational truce” (Nelson and Winter 1982) on the one hand, and reduce the 
discretionary power they obtained within the organization, on the other (by possibly reducing their local 
decision making power).  
 
The resistance met during the setting up of codification procedures also indicates the difficulty for 
enterprises of maintaining a balance between sustained innovation and organizational stability. Indeed, 
codifying procedural knowledge, as in the context of ISO standards, responds to a need to articulate and 
memorize existing knowledge by giving less room for creativity. Nevertheless, behind managerial 
methods, there often are gaps between what individuals and organizations claim they do and what they 
actually put in practice.  This gap can be analyzed as a form of resistance or as a certain amount of 
discretionary power or leeway enjoyed by the individuals. These evolutions are also observed at 
political level in organizations that claim to have implemented a certain level of organizational 
practices, but whose theoretical claims are not corroborated by reality. The discrepancy between 
“ostensive routines” and “performative” ones which has been studied theoretically and empirically 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003) shows organizations’ difficulty in controlling the routines developed and 
their lack of power in the face of individuals’ free will. 
  
Leibenstein (1987) reaches a similar conclusion and highlights that the individuals in an organization 
exert varying degrees of effort.  Their effort convention is implemented in relation to local practices and 
the individuals exert more or less effort depending on a given social and historical context, in other 
words, depending on whether or not they like the conditions in the firm.   
 
In the nuclear industry, this gap between existing routines and the routines that should be implemented 
has been well described by the concepts of “official memory” and “underground memory” (Girod-
Seville, 1998). In this industrial sector, the level of prescriptive specificity is quite high, which 
sometimes causes individuals to deviate from the administrative rules and to invent and combine their 
own practices to solve problems.  This leads to differences between the official level of memory such as 
the management team sees it and the reality of this organizational memory. The individuals’ creativity 
and resistance generate knowledge and cognitive representations that differ from the level prescribed by 
the management team.  The political and cognitive dimensions are therefore the two hidden sides of one 
same process through which routines develop, but whose content oscillates between repetition and 
creativity depending on circumstances and on individuals and organizations’ dispositions.   
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242) The necessary involvement of individuals in the creation of a new form of procedural knowledge: 
an illustration  
 
The second possible interpretation for individuals’ resistance is that the new forms of knowledge cannot 
be implemented in a “mindful” manner if they do not make sense to the individuals.  As Feldman (2000) 
suggests, routines are “effortful accomplishments” and “emergent accomplishments”. Thus, until the 
individuals have accepted and made sense of them, they cannot be deployed as they should be (i.e. 
requiring minimal vigilance for their application).  The example below illustrates the difficulty of the 
process. 
 
Through a case study B. Denis and I conducted in the mid 1990s, I was able to observe this difficult 
memorization and routinisation of tasks (Lazaric and Denis, 2001, 2005).  The firm we surveyed 
(Defial) was a food-processing enterprise that supplied meat to wholesalers and collective caterers.  This 
company was in the process of implementing the ISO 9002 quality standard and for this purpose had to 
reconfigure its knowledge base (for a detailed analysis and an explanation of our empirical observations, 
see Lazaric and Denis 2005).  
 
 This resulted in a new memorization and routinisation of tasks, but involved great difficulties both 
socially and cognitively. In order to implement the ISO 9002 standard, the firm Defial needed to 
reconfigure its organizational memory. Before the implementation of this standard, the employees - 
technicians and employees - had important discretionary powers with regard to quality control in the 
workshop and during the different stages of meat cutting and processing
8. The introduction of the ISO 
9002 standard represented a break from the traditional routines existing in the firm. Indeed, change 
occurred at two levels. Firstly, new technological tools were introduced: scales, automatic measurement 
and tuning devices as well as computers for the follow up and compilation of all technical data. The 
goal was to ensure traceability of the meat, and this could only be achieved by using new control and 
measurement tools. Secondly, the data collecting tasks were redistributed and centralized with the 
introduction of a quality manual in which was centrally memorized all the data related to organizational 
practices, the follow up between the various groups and the different stages of production. Although this 
process of change does not, a priori, seem complex, it proved extremely difficult to implement. The 
reasons for this difficulty deserve careful examination.  
 
In fact, one of the reasons was related to the high level of procedural knowledge. Defial was a 
traditional family enterprise well established in the region, and whose functioning and organization had 
                                                 
8 However, the health safety crisis that affected the beef market in Europe led to the implementation of strict 
selective measures that forced meat suppliers to comply with new quality control procedures, or else face eviction 
from the market. Thus, Defial had to implement the ISO standard rapidly, for fear of losing its regular clients. 
  23remained almost unchanged since the mid 1950s
9. Practices were therefore transferred “on-the-job” by 
employees and the average productivity rate depended on the level of cooperation between the 
employees and their ability to reduce intra organizational conflicts. The management team spent very 
little time in the workshop and trusted their foremen. As a result, the knowledge was transferred 
empirically without the management team intervening to verify the content of the work. Quality control 
was the responsibility of the maintenance team who collected samples of meat to have them controlled 
externally.  In this context, the volume of procedural knowledge evolved progressively and regularly.  
 
The introduction of the ISO norm had a significant impact on both forms of knowledge memorization. 
Indeed, declarative memory was disrupted by a sudden inflow of new organizational and technical 
procedures.
10. In short the new division of labor required that the employees remain vigilant at all times 
(i.e. mindful), and “unlearn” some of their old procedural knowledge. For most employees the new 
process of memorization was difficult, firstly because of the employees’ resistance to the changes that 
were taking place, and secondly because the new declarative knowledge that was to generate new 
procedural knowledge was not introduced and assimilated in one day. The cognitive automatisms were 
acquired more or less easily during the training phase and the employees inevitably experienced the 
“information overload syndrome”
11.This is well illustrated by a remark made by a member of the 
management team:  
 
“Employees played their role, but the compilation of documents caused a major upheaval.  In an 
effort to increase awareness among employees, we, along with the quality manager, summoned 
each team in turn and explained the role of the new procedures, why they were implemented, and 
why it was important for employees to record their actions.  Although initially the operators 
recorded how they operate the controls, they soon stopped focusing and forgot to write down what 
they were doing. We (the management) had to constantly be there in order to observe them. Now 
the practice of taking notes is carried out more automatically.  It is becoming an automatism” (The 
management, Defial, in Lazaric and Denis, ibid)  
                                                 
9 The technical tools used evolved progressively but organizational practices had changed very little. With regard 
to the labor force for example, the firm recruited and then trained local people with low levels of qualifications. 
10 The workers had to familiarize
 themselves with the new technological tools and learn how they functioned. In 
parallel to this, a new system of information flow management was implemented to facilitate information 
processing within teams, select significant practices that could serve as references, write the main control 
procedures implemented and transfer them to the following stage of production, and finally compile descriptions 
of all stages of production and make them available to the quality manager who could, if need be, modify the way 
in which certain tasks were performed. The volume of technical and organizational information needing 
processing was vast, especially for employees who were not accustomed to using computers to compile lists of 
technical problems.  
 
11 The process was gradually stabilized thanks to the implementation of a training course that increased the 
employees’ empirical knowledge and taught them how to manage the various flows of information and 
synchronize it adequately even though the technical objects are highly dispersed. Moreover, the volumes of 
information, which had previously seemed unmanageable, were progressively processed and distributed more 
efficiently between the different actors. Learning to compile data efficiently was essential to the creation of 
procedural knowledge
. 
  24  
 
The difficulty of memorizing tasks observed in Defial also explains why the creation of new procedural 
knowledge was uneasy.  Indeed, individuals are very sensitive to the content and meaning of their work 
and might not always accept a reconfiguration of their knowledge and the implementation of new 
representations of the latter. Furthermore, and this is a question that deserves examination, the 
individuals who resist change because they do not wish to shake their habits or work in an environment 
that demands great attention and energy, are not necessarily the least capable of changing their 
procedural knowledge. These individuals can derive great pleasure from learning foreign languages or 
from trying a new sport. Consequently, the evolution of procedural knowledge in an organizational 
context, and simultaneously in a context of private life, needs to be explored to better understand the 
sources and content of procedural knowledge. The recent studies have made important contributions, 
but more in-depth observations are necessary to understand how the organizational context affects 





243 Effort convention and motivation: a discussion 
 
Using Defial’s example of task memorization, I have tried to show why the creation of new 
automatisms was a delicate exercise. Indeed, individuals demonstrate some resistance to unlearning. 
Furthermore, although the incentive system plays a fundamental role, it does not solve all the problems. 
Individual and collective involvement is also needed.  This sustained effort is the keystone of the setting 
up of new organizational routines and implies genuine individual and collective motivation. We can 
clearly see here that the debate on cognitive science is relevant to the study of routines and that it helps 
understand the difficulty, for organizations, of changing routines. Motivation is a conscious act and a 
commitment of individuals to take part in a new learning process, and as Leibenstein noted (1987), 
authority and hierarchy cannot take the place of this deliberate effort. 
 
 According to Leibenstein, the hierarchical structure could not control the daily routines of its members 
because they are able to exercise their discretionary power (Leibenstein 1987). In this perspective, an 
exploration of the micro foundation of the firm is necessary in order to better understand the social 
context in which the individuals modify their efforts (Leibenstein 1979), and more specifically, in what 
conditions they can reconcile their personal interests and those of the organization
12. This compromise, 
called the “effort convention”, is a state where individuals have discretion in choosing the level of their 
                                                 
12 In the Simonian framework, the individuals in the organization must accept the targets of the organization and 
must identify psychologically with these targets ( Simon 1991)   
  25performance; This effort convention could be described as a “social habit” or “a routine that has an 
interpersonal component” (Leibenstein, 1982: 93).  
 
The question of motivation is not new (Bargh, ibid) and has been at the center of many studies in the 
fields of social psychology and organization theory. Deci and Ryan (1985) have shown, through the 
“self determination theory”, that there exist several forms of motivation:  the motivation which is 
intrinsically linked to the individual’s values (i.e. his internal and inalienable values) and the extrinsic 
motivation which is more dependent on the “external environment” and is related to a tangible or 




The literature on motivation has expanded dramatically in the past few years.  It is therefore not my 
intention here to describe it in detail (also see Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007).  However, the notion of 
motivation is seldom related to the notions of effort convention and of routines (for rare exceptions, see 
Mangolte & Guennif 2002, Lazaric & Raybaut 2005, Foss 2007). And yet motivation now appears to 
determine, firstly, the way in which individuals involve themselves and take part in the implementation 
of new procedural knowledge or new “performative routines” (Feldman 2000), secondly their ability to 
examine their own cognitive automatisms with a critical and vigilant eye (Langer and Moldoveanu, 
2000) and finally how they make sense of their work (Weick 1979, Reynaud 2005).  
 
The motivational dimension has never been completely ignored in the conceptualization of routines.  
Indeed, in their analysis of organizational routines, Nelson and Winter (1982) highlighted two 
dimensions: the necessity to sustain an “organizational truce” if the firm is to function with efficiency 
and regularity, on the one hand, and the organizational reality and the difficulty of avoiding conflict 
within the firm on the other:  “ routine in operation is consistent with routinely occurring laxity, 
slippage, rule-breaking, defiance and even sabotage” (Nelson and Winter, 1982; for a  more detailed 
discussion also see Becker, Lazaric, Nelson and Winter, 2005, 779). 
 
Motivation and the social and cognitive dimension therefore co-evolve with one another and it is the 
very nature of this co-evolution that needs to be understood.  The aim is not so much to show that a 
political dimension is added to a more “cognitive” dimension, so much as to understand the interactions 
between the two.  The effort convention does not imply that a new dimension is added to the theory of 
routines, but more modestly, that we must understand how certain cognitive automatisms can have a 
social and institutional origin, which can help us understand their possible evolution.  
                                                 
13 The limitations of the incentive system, notably with only extrinsic and monetary compensation, have been very 
well documented in the literature showing the ambiguity of the bonus rule. Firstly, bonus rules are path dependant 
and entangled in a more global incentive system with potential myopic behaviours (Reynaud 2005). Secondly, 
incentives might not always be necessary to generate effort in the presence of complementary variables such as 
moral motivation of fairness. 
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Nevertheless, and as Leibenstein highlighted, human nature is largely unpredictable and how much 
effort individuals mobilize is unforeseeable.  This is the reason why he proposed a micro-micro theory 
of the firm to observe the evolution of individuals’ efforts in their organizations.  Finally, it is 
interesting to note that Leibenstein’s reflections concerning this dimension are very close to Feldman’s 
thoughts on effort and individual freedom. In this respect Dopfer (2007) noted: 
 
   « Are humans thus identical to machines? The essential point is this: humans have cognition, 
autonomy and ‘willed’ behavior. They are subjective and their operation cannot be easily 
determined as they can for machines. This is the positive-theoretical aspect. Humans however are 
also different from machines because they are the ultimate orientation for any economic theory. A 
resources model that treats humans like objects misses exactly this negotiable normative point. 
This distinction has a significant bearing on the theory of the firm. Its component parts- subjects 
and objects- are organized by a social and technical organization respectively. A technical 
organization has positional and behavioural task rules that are more or less fixed. Technical 
perfection usually means a high degree of determination. Reliability is not measured in terms of 
willed behavior of the component parts, but as confidence in the instrumental perfection of the 
rules defining the construct. Agents, being subjects, are, essentially, different ‘components parts’ of 
an organization. The rules of a social organization must take on the form of norms that contain an 
‘ought to do’. The major contribution of Leibenstein’s theory is to have made clear that there is a 
big gap between what agents in real firms ought to do and what they actually do “ Dopfer ( 2007, 




In order to understand what drives change in routines, I made an exploration inside the heart of 
cognitive mechanisms for observing the development and evolution of declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Some cognitive processes in human beings remain a mystery but cognitive science research 
is gradually shedding light on some of their aspects.  Furthermore, new dimensions must be taken into 
account to understand the creation of procedural knowledge: individuals’ emotions, free will and 
motivation. From this point of view, Bergson’s contribution is invaluable and in keeping with many 
recent studies carried out in cognitive science. Bargh’s contribution, by highlighting the importance of 
motivation, is symptomatic of this recent reconciliation between the forms of memorization considered 
« automatic » and the more controlled or deliberate processes.  As Langer (ibid) as shown, there is also 
a causal relation, which should be examined more closely, between the concept of « mindfulness » and 
that of motivation.  The debate in cognitive science concurs with the debate on organizations.   
Individual and organizational forms of memorization are distinct but they face the same difficulties:  
  27how are representations made to change, how can a repertoire of knowledge used daily be changed and 
improved, and how can new knowledge be created? 
 
 More generally, the cognitive science debate is a detour that has enabled us to get to the heart of 
processes of individual memorization. This detour is essential if one is to include, in the study of 
organizational routines, new dimensions such as resistance and motivation. These dimensions must be 
taken account of when observing individuals’ acquisition of new procedural knowledge (their resistance 
or their possible acceptance) and when trying to determine how organizations interfere on this process 
by « smoothing » this learning process.  
 
Indeed, organizations use their own filters and mechanisms to generate organizational coordination.  
This memory feeds on individual knowledge but also has its own dimension as it does not merely 
consist of the sum of individual knowledge and must be able to survive when individuals leave.   
Memorization processes are distributed, i.e. they are impacted by the interactions of individuals with 
other people.  The routines rest on the organizational memory implemented and on the procedural 
knowledge and representations of this knowledge (individual and collective representations). The 
organizational context where memorization processes and the creation of routines emerge can, in some 
measure, influence the creation of organizational procedural knowledge. However, as Leibenstein 
(1987) pointed out, a management team has limited control over the content of the work and the way in 
which it is performed and for this reason a sufficient amount of trust is necessary.  An organization can 
create incentive measures, but is also faced with strong resistance.   
 
Finally, change in routines is not purely intrinsic but is also caused by pressure from the environment.  
Nelson and Winter (1982) focused more on the changes caused by external conditions.   Our 
contribution has been to show not only that there are also intra organizational factors that push 
organizations to modify their routines by recomposing and recombining them, but also that tensions 
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